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Abstract: 
In this paper, I argue for a refusal of the ‘politics of origins’ framework that 
dominates human rights talk and towards one that privileges a ‘politics of 
meanings’. Drawing on my ethnographic work on the rights encounter with 
developmentalism and rights in rural Rajasthan, I present a few elements of this shift 
towards a ‘politics of meanings’ and introduce a new conceptual framework, one of 
vernacular rights cultures, which I suggest will help us to conceptually capture the 
dynamic politics of rights and entitlements in the Southern Asia. As a conceptual 
intervention, thinking in terms of ‘ politics of meanings’ and indeed in terms of 
‘vernacular rights cultures’, I argue, will help us move beyond the tired arguments of 
eurocentrism, cultural relativism or celebratory universalism that can no longer 
adequately capture the dynamism of the citizenship claims that are increasingly 
voiced and struggled for. The experiences of making rights claims and entitlements 
that I document are like all experiences and phenomena gendered, and provide 
insights into a fascinating set of paradoxes, disappointments and despair: the 
attachment of rights to privileged gendered bodies while being desired and claimed, 
contested and fought for by the marginalized, the precarious and the powerless.  
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Developmentalism, Human Rights and Gender Politics: From a Politics of Origins 
to a politics of meanings 
 
I write this in the aftermath of huge public protests that erupted in mainly urban 
India in the wake of the brutal gang rape of a 23 year old woman- the protests were 
remarkable not only in terms of the numbers that joined despite the state brutality 
and repression unleashed to suppress these, but also because of unapologetic  
language of  freedom and autonomy that were voiced in these protests. To be sure, 
some of these demands were couched in the patriarchal language of  ‘revenge’, 
‘protection’ and of ‘saving’ but these jostled uneasily alongside unequivocal ones for 
women’s right to autonomy, equality, and freedom:  freedom to use public spaces, to 
wear what they wished and for women to exercise their rights as citizens without 
fear, violence or coercion. Now the protests against rape or sexual violence are 
hardly new. The feminist movement in India has been at the forefront of highlighting 
the institutional and legal shortfalls in meting out justice to victims of sexual 
assaults, organizing the first major public demonstrations and protests in 1979-80 
against the gender prejudicial interpretation and workings of legal and institutional 
bodies in the aftermath of the acquittal in the Supreme Court of the policemen 
involved in the custodial rape of two women, Rameeza Bee and Mathura (Ram 2000; 
John 2002)—both occupying marginal subject positionings—one belonging to a 
‘tribal’ community and the other a poor Muslim—which lead to a decade long 
campaign for legal reforms culminating in the drafting of new legislation intended at 
‘protecting’ women against violence (Agnes 1997). But the December 2012 protests 
were striking not only because of the language of the demands but also because the 
thousands of men and women demanding rights and freedom from violence 
managed to escape—at least to a large extent-- the   delegitimising ‘western’ tag that 
had plagued feminist inspired mobilisations of the past. In other words, the 
rights/human rights they were demanding were not were not disqualified or 
disregarded as representing ‘western feminist’ ideas of women’s rights.  
 
In my view, these December mobilisations present us with yet another occasion 
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through which to consider carefully the framework within which we talk about 
human rights/rights in ‘India and the West’? More specifically, to ask whether these 
mobilisations in any way displace the framework of a ‘politics of origins’ that almost 
always structures discussions of human rights in the ‘non-west’? I suggest that they 
do.  Instead of this near pervasive stranglehold of the  ‘politics of origins’ discourse 
on rights talk, I propose we focus on a  ‘politics of meanings’—one that has at its 
core, a focus on the meanings, subjectivities, ideational and political energies and 
cultures that come into being as a result of rights.  But of course, such an exercise is 
not without its risks; in particular, it is vulnerable to orientalist representations, to 
crude indigenisms, even dangerous neo-nativisms, all of which, pay inadequate 
attention to the multiple sources an contestations which feed conceptual histories 
and by failing to attend to the exclusions and ‘othering’ that occur both within and 
through the discourse and practice of rights.  However, once we’ve acknowledged 
and steered clear of these risks, efforts to refuse the originary discourse of human 
rights opens up new avenues for thinking about human rights politics in different 
parts of the world.  
 
In this paper, I attend to some elements of the ‘politics of meanings’, namely the 
formation of subjectivities, rights claims, entitlements and participation, subjection, 
coercion but also new modes of agency that result from a practical and moral 
encounter with the language of rights.  In deploying the phrase ‘encounter with 
rights’ I mean to emphasise quite simply that the contact with rights is a deliberate 
one, and in this paper, I focus on the encounter with developmentalism; a 
developmentalism that is embraced by both state and non-state actors including 
feminist groups. The political and discursive context I write about here, is one of an 
explicitly ‘rights based’ developmentalism, in particular, the strand of 
developmentalism explicitly concerned with developing poor women as ‘subjects’ of 
development. In this rights encounter, I focus, in particular, on the deployment of 
specific literal and conceptual languages of rights—both the literal term for a right 
which is haq, an Urdu/Arabic literal term, used in large parts of   Southern Asia, to 
invoke a right as well as its justificatory premises.  But of course, haq is hardly a 
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discrete conceptual term and comes enmeshed in a cluster of conceptual ideas. It is, 
however, not enough to only speak of literal and conceptual terms alone; one also 
needs to actively investigate the specific linguistic, sociological, political histories and 
practices that underpin and make possible the life worlds of these words, and 
examine the forms of political cultures, subjectivities, administering practices and 
forms of subjection produced by these rights cultures. The empirical and conceptual 
material in this paper draws attention to the production of ‘vernacular rights 
cultures’ and new gendered subjectivities and forms of subjection that come into 
being as a result thereof. These rights cultures are co-produced and are a result of 
various forms of discursive and policy interventions including metropolitan feminist 
activism, statism, legal constitutionalism, developmentalism, transnational human 
rights discourses, groups and institutions, grassroots citizen and feminist organising. 
In particular, it draws on ethnographic work conducted since 1998 at two sites in 
Rajasthan, North west India: the first, an institutional setting established by a state 
sponsored programme for women’s development and empowerment known as the 
Women’s Development Programme (WDP), Rajasthan    but financed in its initial 
years by the UNICEF1, and the second documents rights based citizen activism and 
mobilisations to push for expanding constitutional rights guarantees to include those 
to food, information and employment. While the latter has been successful in 
mounting both a legal and policy challenge at the Indian state—there now exists 
laws that guarantee rights to information, employment and also to food—for the 
purposes of this paper, both sites offer concrete descriptions and images of complex 
articulations of rights cultures and the subjectivities these engender within specific 
historical relations of dominance, subjection, materiality, statism, politics.  
 
 
II On Conceptual Categories, ‘feminist movement’, ‘Developmentalism’ and ‘The 
West’ 
Theoretical and empirical discussions of human rights/rights take place in 
conceptually saturated and ‘overdetermined’ discourse of a ‘politics of origins’, one 
                                                        
1
 For details on the programme see ‘Rethinking Agency’: Developmentalism, gender and rights’ ( 
2013).  
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which can be entered into only through a clearing exercise or even a refusal: a refusal 
that ironically only reproduces this originary discourse on human rights all over 
again. Keeping this risk in my mind, I outline what I mean by a framework of a  
‘politics of origins’.  By it, I simply mean that the guiding assumptions framing rights 
debates and questions invariably begin with an orientalist assumption common to 
both the celebrators and detractors of human rights, mainly that: the conceptual, 
philosophical and empirical experience of rights across the globe owe their 
formulation to the three revolutions of the modern west, to the English (1680), 
American revolution (1776) and the French revolution (1789). Not only are rights 
politics viewed as western derived but are also regarded as symbolic of this 
continuing western tradition of human rights. Of course, the documentation of this 
global proliferation of human rights (or indeed its refusal) is hardly a descriptive 
project, it is, if anything, a normative one: human rights represent civilisational 
progress to which ‘other’ nations and peoples must aspire, even if it means justifying 
the spread or the protection of human rights through imperialist military invasions 
and ‘humanitarian’ interventions. On the other hand, there are powerful detractors 
of human rights who similarly place rights on a continuum of modernity, progress 
and linear historical time but prioritise economic development as a necessary 
precondition in the progress towards political and civil freedoms. Both these 
positions involve significant historical and intellectual forgetting. Not only are 
universal human rights a recent intellectual and political project within the global 
North, and one that has been mired in social conflict and continues to be bitterly 
fought for, but that discourses of rights and entitlements are powerfully invoked in 
the global South too. But the challenge of resisting originary discourses on human 
rights nevertheless, remains: So how do we resist the nomenclatural politics   but 
also think of the movements/rights claims and politics that take place happen outside 
the non-European world without losing either their historical and political specificity 
or their geopolitical location and hierarchical relationship with hegemonic human 
rights discourses? In other words, how do we go about ‘worlding’ human rights 
without losing sight of their historical, linguistic, political specificities including the 
very specific ways in which these are mobilised and the rights politics that are 
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engendered as a result of their mobilization?  Recent years, however, have seen a rise 
in sophisticated arguments pointing to the often contradictory, alienating, 
exclusionary and politically conservative effects of a universalizing and 
homogenizing 2  human rights politics 3 , implicated and invested in upholding 
existing global power relations and hierarchies of representation (in both senses); of 
being yet another form of ‘transnational governmentality’4 and of constituting a 
‘central’ element of US led globalization, capitalism and world trade5.  In recent 
years, anthropological scholarship has made a significant intervention in thinking 
about questions of rights (Wilson 1997, Cowan and Shenton 2002, Merry and 
Goodale 2006, Goodale 2006, Merry 2009,  Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, Povinelli 
2011, Abu Lughod 2010, Mamdani 2000)  and about the nature and limits of  
modernity within transnational and cross cultural frames.But the question of 
categories and nomenclature remains.  
 
Discussions of women’s rights in India are hardly a stranger to the ‘politics of 
origins’ mode of discourse. My caution in using the category of the ‘west’ and ‘non-
west’ in binary terms owes in some part to the hostile criticisms and reception, 
designed to undermine and disqualify claims for gender equality directed at, the 
feminist movement in India which, in effect, continues to be haunted by two 
characterizations. The first antagonism that is often heaped in its direction by its 
detractors is that it is elite, upper class and caste and seeks to assume voice and 
mantle of leadership by elite, and thereby illegitimately ‘speaking for’ (Alcoff 1995) 
all Indian women and the second, questions the  ‘authenticity’ and cultural propriety 
of feminist politics as those of ‘western’ import and therefore foreign and also 
illegitimate. While both these characterizations can be traced to the identity crafting 
that occurred during the Indian nationalist anti-colonial struggles, these have 
                                                        
2  Kiss, E. (1997) ‘Alchemy or Fool's Gold? Assessing Feminist Doubts over Rights’, in Mary Lyndon 
Shanley and Uma Narayan (eds.) Reconstructing Political Theory: Feminist Perspectives, Penn State 
and Polity Press.  
3
 Wendy Brown,(1995, 2000); Nivedita  Menon, 2004)  ; Kimberley Crenshaw, (2000)  
4
 Inderpal Grewal ( 2005) 
5
 Walter D. Mignolo, (2000; Asad, Talal (2000)  
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continued to find a resonance in postcolonial politics in India6, ensuring that even 
where women’s rights have been explicitly under discussion, these had to be seen to 
be in alignment with emerging definitions of authentic culture/scriptural tradition as 
also a ‘modern Indian’ identity 7 . Consequently, the debate on citizenship in 
postcolonial India has been circumscribed by a careful balance between women’s 
citizenship rights, i.e. their public identities and their religious and cultural roles or 
their private identities (Kapur and Crossman 1996). Two things must be said here: 
while it is entirely legitimate to raise questions about location, voice, representation 
and leadership within the Indian feminist movement, it is also important to note that 
the women’s movement despite difficulties in relation to these, has displayed 
reflexivity and sensitivity to questions of poverty, power, social hierarchy and 
institutional elitism both in its campaigns and in the readings of its historical 
archives.8 And as I have noted elsewhere (Madhok 2010), the idea that advocating 
women’s rights and feminist politics constitutes inauthentic politics and an 
inauthentic social mobilization because feminism happens to have ‘originary’ 
moment in the ‘West’ is weak not least because women’s rights were mooted during 
the anti-colonial nationalist movement itself (Ram 2000; John 1998a), but also because 
the difficulties with rights in India are less to do with their being  ‘ misfits’ or ‘out of 
place’ with Indian culture/tradition, and  more because they arise out of the 
experiential failure of rights (Sunder Rajan 2003) and from the absence of 
accountability and non-individuation of citizen identities ( Ram 2000). 
 
In my view, therefore, it is more productive to think of rights/human rights as not 
wholly derivative from the three major revolutions in the West- the American, the 
French and the English- or entirely oppositional to western notions and conventions 
of human rights or indeed, entirely discrete in form, in that one would be hard 
                                                        
6
 See Rai ( 2002); Mani ( 1989). 
7  
The unease with ‘feminism’ as a western import although,  not confined to the non-feminist 
camps alone(John 1998b) found a renewed chorus with the dominance of religious identity 
politics in the 1980s and 1990s (John 1998a) . 
8 See for instance, Mary John (1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2002), Sunder Rajan (2003) and Kalpana 
Ram (2000).  
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pressed to find hermetically sealed or ‘pure’ indigenous rights traditions but they are 
instead, interlocked into relations that are historically productively, intimately, and 
coercively produced and experienced, attending to the particular forms of  
encounters with rights such as colonial encounters, those with  anti colonial 
nationalism, the constitutionalism spearheading the postcolonial state and its distinct 
forms of developmentalism and bureaucratisation and more recently, through the 
impact of the increased ‘destatization’ and the proliferation of the non state 
organisations advocating ‘human rights’. 
 But of course, to say that we must be cautious-reflexive towards categories such as 
the ‘West’ when speaking of human rights and of human rights discourse, is not to 
suggest that we ignore the geopolitical power relations upheld and signified by the 
West, nor that we lose historical specificity and the historically specific ways that 
human rights discourses and politics have emerged, evolved, travelled, are 
translated, and debated. It simply means that we think carefully about the 
implications that accompany the binary categories ‘west’ and ‘non west’,  — 
reproducing as they do the very representations and power relations we wish to 
refuse, their deployment both rearticulating while also leaving unchallenged the 
justificatory premises that underpin and govern the terms of human rights talk not 
least, privileging and disqualifying particular modes of lived experience. In my view, 
it is much more productive to think of human rights both in a transnational mode, 
recognizing the modes of nodes, circuits and circulation of power—but also in terms 
of specific conceptual categories, languages—both literal and conceptual- anxieties, 
displacements, movements as well as the more settled politics and claims for rights 
and entitlements. In order to conceptually and empirically illustrate the shift to a 
‘politics of meanings’, I adopt the framework of ‘vernacular rights cultures’ which I 
shall discuss in greater detail towards the end of the paper.  
 But you might ask as to what would these moral encounters in very marginal 
contexts with developmentalism and rights bring to how we might think of the 
difficult questions around global human rights discourse? In my view, these 
negotiations shine a torchlight on at least three things: they question whether our 
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genealogical investigation of rights and our obsession with the ‘politics of origins’ of 
human rights is actually justified empirically and practically? And secondly, they 
highlight the gendered nature of rights-of not only how the exercise of rights 
invariably throws up deep seated questions of gender relations and finally, they 
highlight the transnational circuits of rights, and of the different routes through 
which which rights travel,  get picked up, are transformed and are ‘vernacularised’ ( 
Merry and Levitt 2009).  
 
Developmentalism, gendered subjectivities and the ‘doing’ of rights 
 
Although, a prominent part of this rights based developmentalism I focus on here is 
in a significant way concerned with disseminating and enforcing accountability of 
state developmentalism and discernably less about encouraging individual rights 
and personal liberties, it is hard to de-link these except in analytic terms; however, in 
this paper, I shall be focusing to a larger degree on the former.  Before all else, 
however, let me offer a few clarifications. The language of developmentalism is not 
only beamed/spoken by the state alone, and sometimes, the success of penetrative 
success of the state is viewed through the lens of how well it has been able to reach 
‘development’ to what Partha Chatterjee refers to as ‘dark zones’ (Chatterjee 2004). 
However, this focus on the state risks sliding into ‘statism’ and ignores the 
hinterland effect, as it were, or of the power of the state to manufacture consent and 
mobilise support for developmentalism. One only has to cast one’s eye at the list of 
thousands of ‘NGOs’ enlisting themselves as primarily involved in development to 
witness the extraordinary desire for   development. By developmentalism, a term I 
prefer to ‘development, I refer to not only a set of institutions, discourses and 
practices but also to a ‘condition’ or a way of being’. This developmentalism, as I 
conceive it, is normative in its aims; it speaks the language of self-empowerment and 
individual rights and has the transformation of subjectivities as its explicit aim. This 
normative basis for developmentalism accompanies both the state and non state 
actors engaged in ‘development’, even though, the normative ethic that they might 
be pursuing might be quite different. Feminist politics in India has been keenly 
 10 
invested in developmentalism and since the 1970s; it has been a vocal critic of the 
exclusionary politics, institutions, ‘initiatives’ and policies of the developmental 
state. The social unrest of the 1960s also gave rise to demands for more specific and 
group focused development interventions, including a focus on women as a ‘group 
‘within state-led developmentalism. While the increasingly vibrant and visible 
women’s movement instrumental in making sure that it would not longer be 
acceptable for policy makers to be indifferent to gender relations and to the exclusion 
of women from state developmentalism—here  it was both  in step with the 
emerging critique of the dominant representations of women in international  
‘development apparatus’ (Escobar 1995) and in tandem with the burgeoning 
academic scholarship on women’s roles within development---the actual policy shift 
in this regard only came much later, more specifically with the insertion of a chapter 
on women and development in the sixth five year plan and consequently into state 
plans at the provincial level too. The Women’s Development Programme (WDP) 
launched by the Government of Rajasthan in April 1984 was a direct result of this 
attention to women within development policy thinking in India and in turn, 
facilitated in particular, the rights encounter of the sathins whose rights encounter 
constitutes a significant part of this chapter.  9 
 
The feminist movement has raised questions of women’s rights and gender relations 
in the looming background of discourses of constitutionalism, developmentalism 
and empowerment. These are not ordered in terms of hierarchical progression but 
instead are influenced in large part by the prevailing political imperatives. The 
‘autonomous’ feminist movement is seen to have emerged as a separate movement 
in its own right amidst the social unrest and the looming political crises of the 1960s 
which came to a head with the imposition of emergency measures by the federal 
government (1975-77) and suspension of constitutional liberties.  It is important to 
note that the phrase the Indian feminist movement in singular terms does little to 
capture the internal variety or dissent within it. Different strains within the 
                                                        
9
 The Women’s Development Project Rajasthan, DRDPR, Government of Rajasthan, 1984.  
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movement have championed a diverse range of issues related to the environment, 
sexuality, representation, health, civil rights (Kumar 1999); in fact, the movement is 
often said to have experienced three discernable ‘waves’  (Gandhi and Shah (1992) 
also cited in Menon 1999): its anti colonial/nationalist phase, its autonomous/large 
classed mobilisation phase and the 1980s onwards which is witnessing the ‘third 
wave’, of the women’s movement in India (Menon 1999). It was only in 1997 that a 
resolution was passed by the Indian women’s movements congress recognizing 
rights of non-heterosexual groups (Menon cited in Phadke 2003). Currently, the 
women’s movement has found itself at the forefront of debates on sexualities, 
intersectional oppressions, identities, renewed emphasis on institutional and legal 
reform and citizenship—with sexual rights, parliamentary quotas and guaranteed 
citizenship entitlements becoming increasingly important. 
 
 
On Encountering Rights and Developmentalism  
 
The moral, ethical and practical encounter with the rights language that I describe 
here takes place in the context of developmentalism subscribed to by both non-state 
and state actors, although, there is a discernable difference between the forms that is 
practised by the two.  For instance, while both the state sponsored developmentalism 
and non-state practitioners are state focused, by which I mean, they are both attached 
to the state in different ways, there are important differences: the main plank of 
developmentalism, pursued by the non-state actors is very much aimed at enforcing 
state accountability over formal rights already committed to whilst also demanding 
an extension of the list of citizenship entitlements (but these are seldom are raised in 
terms of individual rights), whereas the  state sponsored developmentalism that is 
released is explicitly concerned with raising awareness of state development schemes 
and of widening the net of  ‘beneficiaries’ for these.  But it would be a mistake to 
think of these two strands in binary terms; they are as I will go on to show how they 
overlap and even intersect. The main point that I wish to highlight in the section is 
the actual deployment of the literal term for right which as I pointed out earlier, is 
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haq and a few of its conceptual and philosophical underpinnings 
 
In the case of the sathins, for instance, the sathins, who are after all, development 
‘workers’ 10  of the state, engage with the statist discourse of rights and 
developmentalism in very interesting and creative ways. It is important to note that 
the state provides a very real sense of support/legitimation of their rights work while 
also drawing attention to them as target of serious conflict.  In the initial years of 
their participation within the programme, the sathins would, for example, use a very 
statist language of rights in order to make the case for rights. So, for example, 
consider the following excerpted narrative:  
 
At the (WDP) ‘training’, I was taught that women had rights too, and that 
practising untouchability was wrong. I had learnt that no one was an 
untouchable and that everyone had equal rights. And when I went back 
to the village, I went to draw water along with four Kumhars. A man 
belonging to the Meena caste came there and shouted at me saying, ‘How 
dare you come and draw water from here?’ I replied, ‘is it your father’s 
tube well that we can’t use it? The sarkar has installed it and we all have 
an equal access to it’. Our sarpanch came and said that I was right and 
now everyone draws water from the tube well’.  
 
But as I have documented elsewhere, this fairly straightforward defence of rights 
becomes more complex as the relationship with the state becomes more fraught or 
enters what I call a ‘crisis of reflection'. The process through which this ‘crises of 
reflection’ occurs is both moral as well as practical. The moral process comprises a 
dynamic ethical reflection consisting of attempts to not only rethink many of the 
moral rules informing their own moral frameworks, but also of selectively absorbing 
many of these ‘new’ ideas and language in creative and somewhat less unhesitant 
ways. In an important way, this moral regression of the state among the sathins is 
brought about through its failure to come through on its promise of protecting 
                                                        
10
 For disputes over their status as ‘workers’ of the state see ‘Rethinking Agency’ ( 2013) 
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women’s rights, forcing the sathins to weave an independent mainstay for rights, 
separate from the state.  These new ideas of rights, in the first instance, may appear 
to be closely associated with the state, but as a result of a gradual process of moral 
regression of the state in their popular perception,  - from primarily a principled 
entity backed by an ‘irresistible power’, deploying its power to establish the good in 
society to being viewed as aligned to special class/caste interests- the sathins realise 
that the state can be no longer provide the philosophical mainstay for rights. And 
thus, with this changed view of the state from one comprising not just a   ‘pack of 
principles’ but also a  ‘structure of practices’, the sathins find themselves left with an 
intellectual need to   justify the principles that they had hitherto attributed to the 
state. However, in proposing an alternative philosophical justification, the sathins 
also need to justify this new normative basis for rights in a language that is 
acceptable, comprehensible and morally significant. In order to   justify principles of 
rights upon an alternative premise, the sathins turn to a conceptual term of high 
moral value within the vernacular to legitimise this non-statist justification for rights. 
They begin to legitimise their use of haq by invoking it in synonymy with Truth. In 
their case, it is not so much a creation of new literal terms or neologisms to 
accommodate the new language of individual rights but of manufacturing a new 
moral legitimacy for this new conceptual thinking.  Consider for example, the 
following: 
 
We sathins exist so that we can assist the depressed and deprived 
women and become their voice. “Sathin ko karyakarm bohut tej 
khopri che” (the sathin programme is a very clever one). If there is 
any injustice happening, say for example on a bus, the educated 
women just sit straight in their seats, they don’t utter a word. They 
have money, they are privileged, why should they get their hands 
dirty and speak up? We speak the Truth and walk the path of Truth.  
the Sarpanch, the Patwari can go whichever way they want, but I will 
always walk the way of Truth. There is only twenty five percent Truth 
in politics. The Sarpanch and Patwari are partners in corruption- why 
should they speak the Truth? They benefit by not walking the path of 
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Truth. Whereas the sathin always speaks the Truth as she is not in 
with them and their corrupt schemes11.  
 
Before, we discuss these narratives a little bit more, I must also point out here that 
the developmentalism that is beamed at the women development workers is quite 
explicitly engaged in producing a particular ‘development subject’ and in facilitating 
the emergence of certain forms of subjectivities amenable to ‘development’.  This 
moral encounter of the sathins with rights and developmentalism, as I have shown 
elsewhere, [I show] is creative, injurious, risk-laden and deeply destabilising leading 
to the sathins fashioning not only new ways of viewing their social and moral worlds 
but also of crafting a new lens through which to both view themselves and their 
subject/gender positionings (Madhok 2013 (a, b) 12  For state developmentalism, 
women selected as sathins undergo a ‘training’ (also referred to in the narrative 
above)  so as to  align themselves with the normative impulse of this new ( and 
dynamically unstable) discourse of developmentalism.  Becoming a sathin, therefore, 
requires a certain reorienting and re-crafting of the self so as to meet the expectations 
of personal transformation in matters not only ethical and moral but also of 
comportment, speech, and sartorial. These exercises in the refashioning of 
subjectivities and the constituting of one self as a development ‘subject’ – as 
articulated in the speech practices of the sathins – must not be seen as either 
autonomous practices deployed by are either retreating into an hermetically sealed 
inner self nor should these be seen as any way freely chosen.  On the contrary, the 
self- conscious operations or ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault 1994, 225) that the 
sathins perform upon themselves in order to wrought a desirable subjectivity helps 
                                                        
11   In their narratives, truth, increasingly seen as synonymous with justice and justice is 
articulated in terms of women’s rights, and the credibility of the state becomes inextricably linked ( in 
their narratives) to its commitment and ability to not only protect the Truth but also the interconnected 
set of moral principles; equality, justice and rights, which are seen as components of Truth.  Thus, the 
truth, as articulated by the sathins  is that women have rights, but that powerful interests in the 
community subvert these rights and in doing so interfere with the Truth.  
 
12
 In documenting  their rights narrative over their twenty year participation in this development programme, I 
found that there was a distinct pattern in their thinking and speech practices which could be plotted in terms of  
there were  three distinct  ‘stages’ . The initial contact with rights based ideas produced in their wake considerable 
moral dissonance and suspicion which in turn gave way in time to a ‘new-found faith’ in a state-centric discourse 
of rights and finally, in the face of serious failings of the state, they are forced to weave their own theoretical and 
practical defence of the idea of rights independent of the state. 
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focus attention on the ‘technologies of power’ (Foucault 1994, 225) that accompany 
developmentalism as a form of governmentality (Li Murray 2007) oriented towards 
‘shaping’ particular modes of beings and kinds of subjectivities (Burchill 1996). 
 
In contrast, to the statist developmentalism encountered by the sathins, the version 
of ‘development’ that the participants of various non-state citizen mobilisations that I 
have been ethnographically documenting since 2004 encounter, are engaged in is the 
production of a particular kind of activist citizen subject. By this, I do not mean to 
imply that the sathin is not an activist subject, but only that her activism is of a 
slightly different kind. The activist citizen subjects mostly tend to direct their 
activism at the shortcomings of the developmental state, exercising a constitutionally 
sanctioned language of citizenship rights and claims in order to press for fulfillment 
of existing entitlements or for a more expansive interpretation of these. But this 
separation between the two kinds of citizen activism, between the non-state and the 
statist- is in effect, an analytical separation really, and cannot be sustained after a 
particular point. And let me illustrate here what I mean by this through examining 
two narratives from my documentation of rights, citizenship and entitlements within 
citizen mobilisations. 
 
Consider for instance, Prem Bairwa’s deployment of the rights language.  Prem 
Bairwa is a dalit woman who at the time of this interview was a member of the 
village council in her village of Kotkhawada, Jaipur district. In addition to her role as 
a member of the local village council, Prem Bairwa is affiliated to a large and 
internationally funded well NGO13 and is also closely associated with the National 
Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), a national level advocacy organisation 
in India. 
According to her: 
 
‘As a council member, I have a haq in the panchayat (village 
council) to get   development done in the village. Do only men 
                                                        
13
 Cecoedecon noted by many to be one of the largest recipients of foreign funds. Interview with Sunny 
Sebastian, Rajasthan correspondent for the ‘ The Hindu’, February 2004, Jaipur. 
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have the right to speak and conduct political business; are not 
women to enjoy these rights equally? It is a fight for my haq 
and a fight I have to fight myself. The government has given 
these rights to women; Indira Gandhi has started the mahila raj 
of women. Before her, there were no women’s rights. In case 
governments change ‘our’ rights then we have to fight the 
government. After all, it is ‘us’ who make the government’.14 
 
 
 
Another version of this ‘activist citizen subject’ is also evoked in my fieldwork 
among the political and field workers of the MKSS. This active view of citizenship 
rights contains fluent expressions of an activist oriented view of citizenship replete 
with notions of self-governance, accountability and responsibility that define ‘active’ 
citizenship. The MKSS or the ‘Association for Workers and Farmers’ have been 
involved in a long drawn struggle for the right of ordinary people to gain access to 
state financial records and state audits of development projects and has spearheaded 
a social movement espousing the right of public information and of the people’s 
right to know about the government’s economic functioning. The right to 
information (RTI) movement began in the early 1990s to highlight the gross failures 
of the state to uphold minimum wage legislation particularly within drought relief 
programmes set up in order to provide stipulated employment to people in drought 
affected districts and to focus on the flagrant inefficiencies and corrupt practices 
within the state public distribution system (PDS). However, the activities of the 
MKSS have not been limited to exposing the everyday forms of official corruption 
and focusing on procedures of governmental accountability but have also come to 
expose the ‘multifaceted nature of corruption’ within the legal and political system15. 
In their decade long movement, the MKSS have championed innovative social 
techniques of mobilisation and public appraisal. Perhaps, the most innovative 
feature of MKSS’s campaign for RTI has been the introduction of participatory social 
                                                        
14
 Interviewed in 2004, Kotkhawada, Phagi Panchayat, Jaipur. This is an extract from a longer 
interview with Prem Bairwa. 
15
 Goetz, Anne Marie and Rob Jenkins (1999) ‘Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical implications 
of the right to information movement in India’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 20 No. 3. 
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audits of public expenditure or ‘jan sunwais’. Typically, a ‘jan sunwai’ consists of the 
submission of individual and collective testimonies about corrupt official practices 
for instance of fake muster rolls, corrupt state officials including state affiliates such 
as ration shop owners and elected local government representatives, at a pre-
designated public space to which the concerned state officials/political 
representatives are invited to present their defence or give an account of their 
practices. 
The interview below is excerpted from a lengthy conversation with two prominent 
members of the MKSS. According to them:  
 
‘. The road is built with our money. It is ‘our’ money because we pay 
income tax and we pay also tax on whatever we buy such as rice, dal and 
cooking oil. That is how the sarkar (the state/government) builds 
hospitals and schools. It builds these with “our” money. The money that 
people used to think was sarkari or the building that was deemed to be 
sarkari, we tell the people it is not sarkari but it is ‘our’ building and it is 
“our” money. ‘Our’ democracy must be safeguarded for that will make 
our rights safe. ‘Our’ effort should be that the constitution continues to 
guarantee the rights of citizens.’16 
 
 
Even though, we can discern a clear deployment of haq running through each of 
these narratives, each one of these must be considered in their distinct discursive, 
institutional and political context.  These activist subjects must not be confused with 
embodying either ideas of civic republicanism -- self-governance, rights and public 
service-- nor as whole heartedly endorsing liberal citizenship (subjects of rights and 
entitlements). Both liberal citizenship and civic republicanism in so much as they are 
premised upon a   contractual arrangement between the individuals and the state, 
affirming negative liberty and autonomy for individuals on the one hand with civic 
participation on the other, presume the presence of homogenous political 
communities. Neither liberal rights and selfhood nor homogenous political 
communities inform the justificatory premise of haq as citizenship; and even when 
                                                        
16
 Interview with Tej Singh and Narayan, Rajsamand, 2004. 
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citizenship is considered explicitly based on a common identity, the practice of rights 
has brought this homogeneity under considerable strain. Moreover, when we 
consider all four narratives together, we find a peculiar but a discernible pattern 
emerging from these.  Many of these narratives whether they rest their justificatory 
premise of rights on law or the state or on the constitutional rights and obligations of 
citizens, retain with the people in the final instance, the right to change both the 
law/government or the constitution if it fails to uphold the rights of citizens. In other 
words, although the justificatory premise of rights in both is placed in 
law/constitution and in citizen prerogatives, in both cases, there is a clear 
enunciation that somehow although law/constitution is required to justify these 
rights, haq has an independent justificatory premise separate from the prevailing 
legal regime. haq thus can said to lie in a “zone of non coincidence between 
individuals and the positive legal order of the state”17Therefore, whereas the law 
regulates rights and upholds these, it cannot extirpate these. The reference to haq is to 
an entity, which exists independent of the law and possibly has a moral authority of 
its own. But this does lead us to think about haq and its meanings and it is to this 
that I shall now turn to. 
 
The Routes, meanings and the politics of doing haq 
 
At this point, you might ask: what of haq and how does it relate to rights/human 
rights? The literal term haq is remarkably cosmopolitan and has an interesting 
intellectual history. As the principal Arabic word used to denote a ‘right’, it enjoys an 
intellectual recognition across the Arabic-speaking peoples in the Middle East and 
North Africa and among several communities in South Asia. In Southern Asia, the 
literal term haq, a pre- Islamic Arabic word also available in classical Hebrew, Persian 
and in some of the older Semitic languages of Aramiac, Phenician, Mendian, 
transcends geographical and religious boundaries and is used to invoke a ‘right’ by 
different religious and linguistic communities in Northern India as well as in 
Pakistan.  I have written about the etymological history of the word haq and of some 
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edited by Quentin Skinner and Bo Strath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,, Pg 98 
 19 
elements of its conceptual history elsewhere18, but here I will simply like to point out 
that it is in fact, the word used that was deployed by my fieldwork respondents both 
in India and in Pakistan.  The presence of this word begs several questions for me, 
not all of these can be engaged with in this paper but let me iterate some of these, 
nevertheless: If the word haq was already present in the social vocabulary then why 
did the language of rights appear so novel, alien, exclusionary and unavailable? 
What sorts of intellectual, conceptual and philosophical cultures was haq embedded 
in, what particular traditions of orality and textuality supported haq as a claim, what 
kinds of political cultures of rights were these rights movements drawing upon and 
creating in turn? What were its spheres of influence and implementation? Did it 
belong to those who already had rights?  And what sorts of rights meanings were 
being advanced and how did these in turn, impact mainstream western derived 
thinking on rights. What sorts of narratives or forms of belonging did the word haq 
invoke?  Intrigued by the presence and the deployment of the term, I focused on 
trying to think about the function of rights, or of haq, its meanings, and the 
justificatory premises that underpinned its life world in the subcontinent and of the 
work that it did or was made to do.  In the event, I have now documented five 
different justificatory premises of haq; three of which I have provided snapshots of in 
this paper, namely rights as a statist doctrine, as one that inaugurates an  ‘activist 
citizen subject’ and right as signifying ‘truth’. The two that do not find their 
exposition here are: haq as a cosmological idea and as an Islamic doctrine.  I have 
examined each of these in detail elsewhere (Madhok 2009), and so here I shall simply 
go on to talk about the experiential and ethical interventions of rights in the life 
worlds of my field subjects.  
 
Throughout my fieldwork amongst the sathins, for instance, I found them to express 
a cautious enthusiasm for political rights; an important reason for supporting 
political rights, according to the sathins, was the promise of meaningful political 
citizenship and ‘recognition respect’ ( Darwall 1977) they held out. The language of 
rights make available – and for many sathins, for the first time ever – a discursive 
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terrain whereby they find themselves becoming ‘available’ to themselves and to 
others through a shared political subjectivity – that of a citizen. The language of 
political rights then opens up the arena of citizenship or at least its possibility, albeit, 
however, fragile and one to which the sathins aspire.  What was undeniable in their 
narratives however, was the ideational energy that rights brought to 
developmentalism. This ideational energy of rights, particularly around political 
rights produced in its wake distinct subjectivities and self-representations among the 
sathins, namely those of a rights bearing subject; a relational-political subjectivity and 
a political literate subjectivities19. Their high level of political literacy, however, only 
made the sathins very cautious on rights; rights were both a route to gaining a citizen 
subjectivity--, and one which had been hitherto denied to them—whilst also a great 
magnet for conflict; so while, it is the case, that rights made available the grammar of 
recognition respect, however, the actual claiming of this recognition respect was 
however, a different matter altogether, and one that was not without conflict, 
struggle, violence risk and injury.  Another aspect of rights that reflected in their 
narratives was of their indivisibility and intersectional nature; rights were and 
neither clearly divisible nor discrete while also co-existing with patriarchies and 
oppressive gendered practices.  Consider for example, case of Manohari Bai, a 
member of ‘Marudhar Ganga Society’, a local NGO working for dalit rights based in 
Jodhpur district, who stood up during the gram sabha and demanded the right to 
know what was happening to the proposal to build a school for girls in her ward.  
She was mercilessly beaten by the Sarpanch (a Choudhury by caste and his 
supporters) and her clothes torn off.  Manohari Bai describes the incident in the 
following interview: 
 
 ‘In 2002, sometime in August –September, I went to the gram sabha 
meeting where I stood up and asked about what had happened to the 
proposal for the girls school which had been approved in our ward (no. 
14).  The Sarpanch said, “chup ho ja, tu kaun hain bolni wali” (you must 
shut up, who do you think you are to pose these questions’?)  Then all 
violence broke loose. There were 500 men who shouted obscenities at me 
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and I was beaten up, my dupatta and other clothes were torn off me 
whilst all the time the people kept shouting “randi baith ja”’(sit down you 
whore). My attackers were mainly Rajputs and Jats but there was also 
one Mali and even a sarkari karamchari, I mean he was a Patwari…I went 
to Osian, and then after a month and a half the police registered a case 
against them. The police only registered my case after I pleaded my case 
with the Chief Minister and he ordered a case to be registered. The police 
did register a case after pressure from the Chief Minister’s office, but they 
put a FR (False Report) against it. In the courts, the magistrate was 
pressured by the police and the Sarpanch and he dismissed the case. I 
didn’t give up though and I took the case up to the high court in Jodhpur. 
I am now waiting for a date for a hearing to be announced”20.  
 
 
Apart from the graphic account of the violence that Manohari Bai recounts, her 
narrative also points to the intersecting nature of rights. For instance, demanding the 
‘right to information’ from elected representatives or indeed public officials about 
public work programmes of health, education or work programmes can in many 
cases involve a simultaneous claim for gender and caste equality whilst in the same 
breath drawing attention to corruption within the local and state bureaucracies, the 
judicial system and to the flouting of procedural norms within the administrative, 
executive and legislative system itself. Perhaps, it is the indivisible nature of rights  
(and the futility of analytically trying to isolate them into categories)–of political and 
civic entitlements intersecting and interwoven with personal/individual rights- that 
makes rights politics so conflictual.  
 
And finally, the third reflection on rights that emerges from an examination of the 
sathin narratives is one not dissimilar to what feminist scholars have long pointed out 
namely: the paradox of liberal rights – the formal promise of equal rights and 
citizenship for the free-standing, abstract, and unencumbered individual becoming 
hollowed out and rendered unrealisable for the concrete and socially located one – 
found a clear articulation in the speech practices of the sathins. In short, while it is 
certainly the case that the sathins employ the language of constitutionally guaranteed 
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 22 
rights, this use is never unqualified or unaccompanied by disappointment, 
frustration, and despair at the elusive and near unrealisablility of rights.21  
 
A few Reflections on vernacular rights talk and feminist politics of rights  
My aim through presenting brief ethnographic glimpses of the encounter with rights 
has been to present elements of an analysis constituting a ‘politics of meanings’ 
which I have argued will help us think more closely about how the contact with 
rights occurs, how rights travel and how they impact everyday ways of living and 
doing politics, in other words, it is a plea towards putting in place an analysis of 
political cultures created in the wake of rights.   I have also referred to these rights 
cultures as vernacular rights cultures here and elsewhere (Madhok 2009). In 
speaking of  ‘politics of meanings’ and vernacular rights cultures and for the need to 
abandon ‘originary rights talk’, I am neither suggesting that we divorce rights talk 
from either how rights operate globally as that would not only be to feign ignorance 
or even worse, wilful blindness of how circuits of power- histories, discourses and 
institutional politics-- within which all rights talk operates, nor am I advocating a 
‘global/local’ framework of rights talk, which I find on the whole quite unhelpful. By 
vernacular rights cultures, I am however, setting up a normative hierarchical power 
relation - that between hegemonic universal discourses of human rights and those 
which are not simply ‘vernacularised’ (Merry 2009) but have their own histories and 
politics; highlighting certain forms of meaning making including ‘strategies’ of 
utilisation of rights linked not only to the historical and cultural identity of the group 
making a rights claim but also to the particular kinds of politics and institutional 
settings that they inhabit and strive towards; and finally, I am also suggesting that 
these rights cultures exist in a relation of marginality and subalternity in respect of 
majoritarian rights discourses associated with the nation state, legal 
constitutionalism and developmentalism. 
                                                        
21  See Madhok ( 2013 b)  
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As a feminist scholar studying vernacular rights cultures, I am only too aware of the 
dangers, injuries, asymmetrical power relations, violence and precarities 
surrounding the doing of rights. Feminist scholarship has demystified the  
gendering/exclusionary/culture reifying/civilisational discourses that human rights 
lend themselves to. In particular, they’ve shown how a certain form of imperial 
politics plays out when human rights are deployed as  championing women’s 
rights—one where the discourse of ‘saving’ the natives from themselves, or indeed 
Spivak’s formulation of ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’, comes 
in only too handy (Brown 1995, 2000; Menon 2004; Crenshaw 2000, Spivak 1999, 
Grewal 2005, Abu Lughod 2001; 2010). In my view, feminist intellectual work on the 
institutional articulation and workings of rights must be accompanied by an 
attention to the ways in which rights languages are picked up and put to use in 
different political contexts by disparate and especially marginal groups so that we 
might produce accounts of how this manifold use complicates and expands current 
rights thinking. Rights are inherently political and must be seen as operating within 
fields of power, and therefore, the task is not one only of examining the discursive 
formulations and the political use that rights are put to but also one of investigating 
the political cultures that rights create (Brown 1995) and the new forms of 
subjectivities and subjection these produce. However, a dilemma for our present 
however is the following: How to reconcile the often paradoxical and unintended 
conservatism of rights thinking together with the ever present dangers of imperial 
politics with the increasing articulation and rights based social mobilisations in 
different parts of the world? As Pheng Cheah has evocatively pointed out, rights 
remain the ‘only way for the disenfranchised to mobilize’ (Cheah 2006:172). Given 
the marginal socialities within which vernacular rights cultures operate, the work of 
documenting rights talk and thinking in marginal contexts involves at least three 
things: it means undertaking detailed ethnographic work that documents both the 
nature of the contact with hegemonic rights discourses but also the precise nature 
and consequences of these ‘modernizing’ interventions; it involves documenting the 
creative languages and conceptual ideas that are produced in the wake of this 
encounter and of the ways in which  the poor and the marginal stake their wager as 
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‘active claimants of modernity’ (Ram 2008: 16); and finally,  in addition to the work 
of tracking and documenting  rights languages, we also need to put in place 
analytical frameworks that enable us to both track and document but also 
conceptually capture the   kinds of political, linguistic and normative strategies 
released by  these rights encounters release  to stretch and dislodge the existing 
normative boundaries of the universal ( Butler 1997), expand the language of 
entitlements and consequently impact and transform public policy. 
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